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Abstract
In this paper we first present supporting evidence of the existence of
heterogeneity in inflation dynamics across euro area countries. Based on the
estimation of New Phillips Curves for five major countries of the euro area,
we find that there is significant inertial (backward looking) behavior in
inflation in four of them, while inflation in Germany has a dominant forward
looking component. In the second part of the paper we present an optimizing
agent model for the euro area emphasizing the heterogeneity in inflation
persistence across regions. Allowing for such a backward looking
component will affect the evaluation of the degree of nominal rigidities
relevant for the monetary policy design. We explore the welfare implications
of this circumstance by comparing the adjustment of the economies and the
area as a whole in response to terms-of-trade shocks under four monetary
policy rules: fully optimal, optimal inflation targeting, HICP targeting and
output gap stabilization.
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Non-Technical Summary
Macroeconomic indicators show that countries belonging to the European
Monetary Union are at different points in the business cycle. In the month of
September 2001, the average inflation rate in the EMU area was 2.6 per cent,
but there was a great deal of variance. Greece, Ireland, Netherlands and
Portugal had inflation rates above the 4 percent while France had the lowest
inflation rate, 2.2 per cent. At the same time, the GDP of the area has increased
by 0.5 per cent during the first quarter of 2001, but with a negative growth in
Finland, the Netherlands and Portugal. How should the European Central Bank
(ECB) conduct overall monetary policy in this variegated environment? The
Maastricht Treaty is not silent on this issue. The primary objective of the ECB is
that of maintaining price stability. Eventually, the monetary policymaker is
permitted to stimulate the growth of the different regions, but it is required that
this be done only without jeopardizing the goal of price stability.
The architects of the European Monetary Union specified a quantitative target
that is to be used to measure the deviations from the price stability goal. This
target is formulated in terms of a weighted average of the Harmonized Index of
Consumer Prices (HICP) of the countries belonging to the union. Each country
has a weight equal to the share of its consumption in total EMU consumption.
The adopted standard required not to exceed 2 per cent. Is the HICP targeting
process a good conveyor of the information relevant to the final goal of price
stability? In this work we analyze the inflation dynamics of five countries
belonging to the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and
Spain. These countries represent the 88 percent of the GDP of the Euro area.
The first result that emerged from the study is that these countries fall into two
groups in terms of the difference in the dynamics of their inflation rates. The first
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includes Germany, which is characterized by price-setters behavior in which sellers
put higher weight on their expectations of future economic conditions rather than on
the past when they set their prices. The other group of countries includes France,
Italy, Netherlands and Spain and is characterized by backward-looking price-setters
behavior. In those countries sellers give higher weight to past economic conditions.
The second Þnding is that the average duration of price contract, i.e. the average
length of time during which prices remain Þxed, is smaller in Germany than in the
other group of countries. In Germany, prices remain Þxed on average for a period of
5 quarters, while in the other group they remain Þxed for 8 quarters.
This result brings out an important asymmetry in the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy in Europe other than the diﬀerence in the economic sizes of the
countries. This asymmetry can be relevant in determining which target is a better
indicator of eﬃciency in the allocation of resources. In this work, we address this issue
in a dynamic general equilibrium model of a currency area following Benigno (2001),
in which there are two regions characterized by diﬀerent price-setting mechanism.
In one region sellers evidence forward-looking behavior in setting prices; while in the
other, past inßation plays also a crucial role in understanding inßation persistence,
through what we call the hybrid model. We then exploit the micro-foundations of
our framework in order to provide a welfare criterion for the Central Bank in terms
of the utility of the consumers. Within this framework we will analyze both the
dynamic adjustment of the driving macroeconomic variables in the regions and area
to terms-of-trade shocks, as well as the welfare implications of alternative monetary
policy rules. We focus on four alternative policy rules: (i) fully optimal policy, (ii)
optimal inflation targeting policy, (iii)Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP)-
targeting, and (iv) stabilization of the area output gap.
According to the criterion of eﬃciency followed by the ECB, we are able to show
within our framework that, in principle, a quantitative target in terms of stabilization
of the HICP does not succeed in eliminating the distortions in the relative price mech-
anism. We have proposed two policies that may perform better: the optimal inflation
targeting policy, which implies that the inßation rate in the region with higher degree
of rigidity should receive a higher weight; and the output-gap stabilization policy.
An inßation targeting policy that assigns higher weight to countries with higher
degrees of inßation persistence beneÞts those countries since once the policy of the
central bank is credible, it produces lower inßation rates for them simply because
it cares more about those inßation rates. Notwithstanding, such a rigidity-adjusted
inßation-targeting policy may create the wrong incentives for the adoptions by the
countries of structural changes that reduce their goods and labor market rigidities.
The policy of stabilizing the output gap is immune to this adverse-incentive criticism
as it gives a weight to each country similar to its economic size as in the HICP-
targeting policy. However, as we have shown, it is less robust across diﬀerent para-
metrizations, and in some cases may perform worse than HICP targeting. Moreover,
it is more diﬃcult to implement since it involves the unobservability of the natural
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level of output. Thus, a policy of stabilization of the output gap is neither easy to
implement nor to communicate to private agents.
These arguments suggest that it may not be desirable to abandon HICP-targeting
for optimal inßation targeting as deÞned in this paper. Nevertheless, it also empha-
sizes that inßation diﬀerentials are not irrelevant for monetary policy. First we have
to be conscious of the welfare costs associated to the distribution of inßation across
countries; and second, cross country inßation information can provide useful infor-
mation as far as the degree of inertia diﬀers across countries.
3
1 Introduction
In this paper we examine the idea that in the euro area monetary policy should be
conducted so as to eliminate, or at least mitigate, the distortions in relative prices
arising from the diﬀerences in the degree of adjustment of inflation rates to terms of
trade shocks (i.e. asymmetric shocks). This broad statement is close to the principle
under which a mandate of price stability has been delegated to the ECB. In fact, as
stressed in the 1999 Bulletin of the ECB (January 1999), the main argument for price
stability is that it improves the transparency of the relative price mechanism, thereby
avoiding distortions and helping to ensure that the market allocates real resources
eﬃciently both across uses and over time. In this paper, we will present an empirical
and theoretical framework where we can explicitly address such an issue.
To do this we proceed in two steps. First, we estimate the main parameters driving
the degree of price stickiness in five major countries of the euro area. We mostly focus
on the implications, for the design of the optimal monetary policy, of the existence of
a diﬀerent nature and degree of inflation persistence across countries belonging to the
European Monetary Union. The first part of the paper concludes pointing out the
existence of two diﬀerent zones inside the euro area. There is one country (Germany)
where we cannot reject that inflation has a significant forward looking component.
This country represents around 35 percent of the GDP of the area. The other group
of countries is formed by France, Italy, Spain and to a lesser extent the Netherlands,
where inflation dynamics are mixed by a forward and a backward looking component.
These four countries represent around 53 of the GDP of the area.
In the second part of the paper we exploit these results with the aim of addressing
some normative issues, as the optimal inflation-targeting policy and the optimal policy
in the euro area. We formulate a two-region optimizing-agent model: in one region
sellers evidence forward-looking behavior in setting prices; while in the other, past
inflation plays also a crucial role in understanding inflation persistence, through what
we call the hybrid model. We then exploit the micro-foundations of our framework
in order to provide a welfare criterion for the Central Bank in terms of the utility
of the consumers. The policymaker seeks to stabilize the output gap as well as a
weighted average of inflation rates in the area. Moreover, importance should be given
to the deviation of the relative price between regions with respect to the natural
level. Finally, given the role of past inflation in understanding inflation persistence
in the area, monetary policymakers should also stabilize the change in inflation in
the region characterized by the hybrid model. Within this framework we will analyze
both the dynamic adjustment of the driving macroeconomic variables in the regions
and area to terms-of-trade shocks, as well as the welfare implications of alternative
monetary policy rules. We focus on four alternative policy rules: (i) fully optimal
policy, (ii) optimal inflation targeting policy, (iii) Harmonized Index of Consumer
Prices (HICP)-targeting, and (iv) stabilization of the area output gap.
According to the criterion of eﬃciency followed by the ECB, we are able to show
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within our framework that, in principle, a quantitative target in terms of stabiliza-
tion of the HICP does not succeed in eliminating the distortions in the relative price
mechanism. We have proposed two policies that may perform better: the optimal in-
flation targeting policy (the inflation rate in the region with higher degree of rigidity
should receive higher weight), which generalizes that outlined in Benigno (2001a), and
the output-gap stabilization policy. Nevertheless, we will show that the applicability
of these policies has pros and cons, making it not so straightforward to move from
HICP-targeting to other forms of targets. In particular, the architects of the ECB
have specified a broad target, HICP inflation less than 2 percent, so as to give flex-
ibility to the monetary policymakers in conducting their policy. Around this target,
policymakers can have the discretion that allows them to evaluate in an appropriate
way the diﬀerent sources of rigidity of the inflation rate, without necessarily disclos-
ing them to the public. In addition, as our analysis shows, in cases where inertia in
the terms of trade is high, monitoring the area output gap can also provide the right
information on the final goal.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the empirical
estimates of the New Phillips Curve for five major countries of the euro area. This
will allow us to identify the degree of price rigidity and so how the degree of inflation
inertia varies across regions of the euro area. In Section 3 we present our theoretical
model and we accordingly calculate the welfare function that policymakers seek to
maximize. We will emphasize how the existence of backward looking price-setters
will aﬀect this welfare. In Section 4 we present a correspondence between the rigidity
intrinsic in the backward looking region and that of the forward-looking region within
the class of inflation targeting policies described above. In Section 5 we analyze the
dynamic adjustment of both the area and the regions within the area to terms-of-
trade shocks, as well as the welfare implications of alternative monetary policy rules.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Diﬀerences in Price Rigidity in Euro-Area Coun-
tries: Empirical Evidence
The aim of this section is the estimation of some of the main parameters driving the
degree of price stickiness in the five major countries of the euro area. Our empirical
strategy follows recent empirical work by Sbordone (2002, 2001), Galí and Gertler
(1999), and Galí, Gertler and López-Salido (2001) that has recently shown that the
New Phillips Curve (NPC) based on real marginal cost does a reasonably good job
in accounting for inflation in the U.S and in the euro area. Here, we pay special
attention to the main countries participating in EMU in order to draw similitudes
and diﬀerences in their inflation dynamics. We view this empirical evidence, as a first
step in constructing a monetary model for the euro area, to which we will devote the
following sections. In particular we mostly focus on the implications, for the design
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of the (optimal) monetary policy, of the existence of a diﬀerent nature and degree of
inflation persistence across EMU member states.
2.1 Basic Set up
Our theoretical approach will be based on staggered nominal price setting, in the
spirit of subsequent works by Taylor (1980), Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). In par-
ticular, firms choose prices optimally subject to constraints on the frequency of price
adjustment. The aggregation of the decision rules of firms leads to an aggregate
Phillips curve equation that relates inflation to cyclical activity. As explicitly sug-
gested by the underlying theory, our measure of cyclical activity will be a measure of
real marginal costs.
In Calvo’s model, each seller faces a fixed probability, 1 − α, of changing its
price. This probability is independent of the length of time since the last adjustment
occurred. In this event, the price is chosen to maximize the expected discounted
profits under the circumstance that the decision on the price is maintained. In this
setup the degree of rigidity can be described in terms of the duration of prices being
fixed, which is given by the expression: DF = 1
1−α . Thus, when α increases, the
degree of nominal rigidity is higher.
Some authors argue that the previous set up should be extended to explain the
persistence of inflation that we observe in both the US and Europe (see, for instance,
Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and Coenen and Wieland (2000)). As shown by Galí and
Gertler (1999), the previous model can be extended by allowing for a fraction of
firms, ω, that act as backward looking price setters. Aggregating across the price-
setting behavior of individual firms yields the following relationship between inflation,
expected future inflation, past inflation, and real marginal cost:
bπt = γbbπt−1 + γf Et{bπt+1}+ eλ cmct (1)
where cmct is the log deviation of the average real marginal cost at time t from
its steady state, and πt is the inflation rate at time t, and eλ ≡ (1−ω)λαφ ; γb ≡
ωφ−1 ; γf ≡ βαφ−1; and φ ≡ α + ω[1 − α(1 − β)]. The parameter β is the
subjective discount factor in consumer preferences, and the slope coeﬃcient eλ is a
function of λ ≡ (1−α)(1−βα)α
1
1+ησ that depends on the degree of price rigidity through
the parameter of the model, α. As we will show, the parameter η is the inverse of
the elasticity with respect to output of the disutility of supplying production, and σ
is the elasticity of demand across the diﬀerentiated goods that can be related with
the steady state markup as follows: µ ≡ σσ−1 .
Notice that the coeﬃcients γf and γb are the same as in the hybrid model of
Galí and Gertler (1999), so when β = 1, then γf + γb = 1 . In addition, the hybrid
model nests the baseline forward looking model in the limiting case of non backward
looking firms (i.e., ω = 0). We will refer to equation (1) as the hybrid formulation of
the NPC, which will constitute the reference model of our empirical estimates.
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Notice that, in this framework, the average duration of prices that are set in
a forward-looking manner is again 1/(1 − α). However, it is not that obvious to
conclude that the average duration of prices in the hybrid model is only captured
by the parameter 1/(1 − α). Indeed, there is another source of inertia linked to the
proportion of firms that set prices in a backward looking manner. In this paper, we try
to characterize a new index of nominal rigidity that will depend upon both parameters
(α, ω). This new index will be of crucial importance for characterizing the optimal
inflation targeting policy and in fact the comparison between the average price rigidity
in a forward-looking model and the average price rigidity implicit in a hybrid model
will be performed according to an appropriate utility-based welfare criterion. Hence,
as we will show in section 4, under this hybrid formulation an index of nominal
rigidity (i.e. the equivalent to the duration) is given by the following expression:
DH = 1
1−α
1
1−ω = D
F 1
1−ω . We can distinguish two components: the first part is
related to the forward looking character of inflation (DF ), the other is related to the
existence of backward looking price-setters ( 1
1−ω ). This latter component reinforces
in a highly non-linear way the degree of nominal rigidities related only to the forward
looking component. Intuitively, this expression reflects the fact that the fraction of
firms which keeps prices constant in each period is not α, but is given by: α(1−ω)+ω.
However, it is worth noting that there might be other criteria of equivalence between
the two models that might give diﬀerent answer. As it will be clearer later in the
text, and equivalence in terms of utlity-based criterion is appropriate in our context.
2.2 Results and Implications
In this section, we use quarterly time series data for the five major countries in
EMU (Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands) over the period 1970:I-
1997:I. All the data are from the OECD Business Sector Database and are available
upon request. Our measure of output is real GDP, prices are measured using GDP
deflator, nominal wages are measured using total compensation, and employment is
total employment.
In Figure 1 we plot, for each country in our sample and for the euro area, annual
inflation as well as our measure of average real marginal cost, i.e. the log of real unit
labor costs.1 As is clear from the figure, both variables move closely together, at
least at medium frequencies in all the countries, and so in the euro area. In general,
our measure of real marginal costs matches the high inflation of the 1970s and early
1980s, and the long disinflationary period of the late 1980s and the 1990’s. This is
particularly true in the case of France, where it is easy to see that inflation anticipates
future movements in marginal costs, as the model predicts.
In order to estimate the structural parameters we follow Galí and Gertler (1999),
and Galí, Gertler and López-Salido (2000). We use expression (1) as orthogonality
condition, so that we can estimate the model using generalized method of moments
1The data for the euro area are from Galí, Gertler and López-Salido (2000).
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(GMM). Let zt denote a vector of variables observed at time t. Then, under rational
expectations, these equations define the following set of orthogonality conditions:2
Et{(πt − ω πt−1 − βαπt+1 − λ cmct) zt} = 0
which corresponds to expression (1). Our set of instruments, zt, includes four lags
of inflation, the real marginal cost (i.e. real unit labor costs), detrended output,
and wage inflation.3 We also check the robustness of our results to changes in the
instruments set, in particular we will also estimate the model using four lags on
inflation and only two lags of wage inflation, output and marginal cost. 4
In Table 1 we present the results for the hybrid model over the period 1970:1
1997:1, which allows us to test directly against the hypothesis of backward-looking
inflation inertia. The first three columns report the estimates of the two primitive
parameters, ω, α, and the discount factor β; while the fourth to sixth columns report
the reduced form coeﬃcients γb and γf , and the slope coeﬃcient on real marginal
cost eλ. Finally, in the last two columns we display the index of price rigidity and the
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions.
The parameter β is rather low in most of the countries excepts for the Nether-
lands, although it is in a reasonable range once we take into account the uncertainty
surrounding the estimates. The degree of price stickiness is well estimated in all
countries. The most striking feature that can be elicited from this Table is that
two diﬀerent groups of countries emerge. The first group is basically represented by
Germany (and to a lesser extent the Netherlands), for which we find no evidence of
backward lookingness in the inflation equation, and so the degree of price stickiness
is quite similar to that obtained in the forward-looking specification. The rest of the
countries (France, Italy, Spain) form a more compact group in which, although the
forward-looking component is slightly more relevant, the backward-looking compo-
nent plays a significant role. In addition, the rest of the parameters of the model are
quite well estimated and in line with the previous results by Galí, Gertler and López-
Salido (2000). As noted above, allowing for a fraction of backward-looking firms will
aﬀect the average duration that prices are kept constant. Thus, in that case the
average duration in the backward-looking group of countries rises to between 6 and
12 quarters for the Netherlands and Spain, respectively. Finally, in row (2) of Table
1 we show that the results are robust to a diﬀerent instruments set. In particular, we
use four lags of inflation byut only two lags of output, wage inflation and marginal
2Notice that λ also corresponds to the reduced form estimates (see e.g. Galí and Gertler (1999)
and Sbordone (2002)).
3In the following analysis, the standard errors are robust to the presence of correlation up to
order eight (Newey-West correction). As stressed by Galí, Gertler and López-Salido (2000), this will
allow to control for the presence of measurement error in our measure of real marginal costs.
4In order to estimate the model we calibrate the parameters η, and σ. We set η = 0.6 and σ = 6.
As it will be clear in the theoretical section, these values are compatible with a steady state labor
income share of 0.75 and a steady state markup µ = 1.2.
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cost.
We view this evidence as supporting the existence of two diﬀerent zones inside the
euro area. There is one country (Germany) where we cannot reject that inflation has
a dominant forward-looking character. This country represents around 35 percent
of the GDP of the area. The other group of countries is formed by France, Italy,
Spain and to a lesser extent the Netherlands and inflation dynamics are mixed by a
forward and a backward-looking component. These four countries represent around
53 percent of the GDP of the area.5
We evaluate the implicit average duration in the group of countries where the
backward looking component is a significant determinant of inflation persistence, by
using the following weighted average: AD =
Q4
i=1(Di)
wi, where i represents the coun-
try and wi is the consumption weight of country i in total consumption in the area.
Using the results in Table 1, the corresponding average duration in this backward-
looking area is slightly lower than two years (7.8 quarters). This value contrasts
with the estimates for Germany, which were slightly more than one year (around 5
quarters). Finally, we try to evaluate the uncertainty surrounding these estimates
proceeding in the following way. We calculate, for each country, two durations that
bound 95 percent of the empirical estimates (i.e. D ± 2 se, where se are the corre-
sponding standard errors - see Table 1-). Using these values we can obtain an upper
and a lower value of the average duration in the group of backward-looking coun-
tries, which can be thought as a measure of the uncertainty surrounding the degree
of inflation persistence in this group of countries. This exercise yields a duration of
between 7 and 8.3 quarters for that set of countries. In the case of Germany, the
forward-looking region of the area, the duration varies between 4.6 and 5.3 quarters.
Finally, given the changes that have taken place in European monetary policy,
in Figure 2 we present the structural estimates, resulting from a rolling regression
starting at the beginning of the nineties, of the degree of price stickiness (i.e. α
and ω, respectively) for each country. As can be seen, our estimates of α are fairly
stable, showing that by using the model we are able to identify this coeﬃcient as a
fairly structural one. A similar conclusion arises for the estimated backward looking
parameter (ω) with a small symptom of instability in the case of Germany. In this
country we find limited evidence of backward lookingness at the beginning of the
nineties, but the parameter progressively diminishes to nil at the end of the sample
period.
3 The Model
In this section, we exploit the results of the previous section to address some normative
issues, such as the optimal inflation-targeting policy and the fully optimal policy in
5The weights are the following: France, 22.3; Italy, 15.5; Spain, 8.5; and the Netherlands, 5.7,
respectively.
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the euro area. In keeping with the empirical section, we model the euro area as a
currency area made up of two regions labeled H and F . In region F sellers show
only forward-looking behavior, instead region H is characterized by the hybrid model
where past inflation plays also a crucial role for understanding inflation persistence.
The whole area is populated by a continuum of agents on the interval [0, 1]. There
is no possibility of migration across regions. A generic agent, belonging to the area,
is both producer and consumer: a producer of a single diﬀerentiated product and
a consumer of all the goods produced in both regions. Households maximize the
expected discounted value of the utility flow. Preferences of the generic household j
are given by
U jt = Et
( ∞X
k=t
βk−t
h
U(Cjk, ξ
i
D,k)− eV (N jk ,eξiS,k)i
)
,
where the upper index j denotes a variable that is specific to agent j, while the upper
index i denotes a variable that is specific to region i. We have that i = H if j ∈ [0, n),
while i = F if j ∈ [n, 1]. Et denotes the expectation conditional on the information
set at date t, while β is the intertemporal discount factor, with 0 < β < 1.
Agents obtain utility from consumption C (through the function U), while they
derive disutility from supplying hours, N, to the production of the diﬀerentiated
product j (through the function eV ). The utility function is separable into these two
arguments. With ξiD and eξiS we denote region-specific demand and supply shocks,
respectively. The consumption index C is a Cobb-Douglas function of the consump-
tion bundles of home and foreign goods, irrespective of the region of residence of the
consumer.6
We assume that the asset markets are complete both at a regional and interna-
tional level and that the law of one price holds without any segmentation in the goods
market across diﬀerent regions. These assumptions imply that the marginal utilities
of nominal and real incomes are equated across regions. Thus, asymmetric demand
shocks are properly oﬀset by appropriate movements in the consumption level of both
regions. Moreover, given that the consumption index is common across regions, it
follows that the consumption-based price index P is equal across regions.
As it is common in the recent literature on monetary policy evaluation, we exploit
the micro-foundations of our framework in order to provide a welfare criterion for
the Central Bank based on the utility of the consumers.7 This criterion allows for a
direct evaluation of the deadweight losses implied by the distortions included in the
model. As welfare criterion, we assume the discounted sum of the utility flows of the
6The framework can be readily extended to analyze the general case with a CES consumption
index, as shown in Benigno (2001b).
7See, for instance, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Woodford (1999b) and Erceg, Henderson
and Levin (2000).
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household belonging to the whole union. The average utility flow is defined as
wt ≡
Z 1
0
[U(Cjt , ξiD,t)− eV (N jt ,eξiS,t)]dj,
at each date t, where it has been implicitly assumed that each region has a weight
equal to its economic and population size. The welfare criterion of the whole union
is then defined as
W = E0
(
+∞X
t=0
βtwt
)
.
Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Woodford (1999b), Amato and Laubach
(2001), Benigno (2001a) and Steinsson (2000), we compute a second-order Taylor
series expansion of W around the deterministic steady state where all the shocks
are zero. Our second-order approximation delivers an intuitive representation of the
welfare function:
W = −ΩE0
(
+∞X
t=0
βtLt
)
, (2)
Lt = Λ[bY Wt − eY Wt ]2 + n(1− n)Γ[bTt − eTt]2 + (1− θ)(πFt )2 + θ(πHt )2 + θψ(∆πHt )2,
where Ω, Λ, Γ, θ, ψ are functions of the structural parameters of the model.8
Note that a cap-variable (b) represents the deviations of that variable from the
steady state under the sticky-price equilibrium, while a tilde-variable (e) represents
the deviations from the steady state under the flexible-price equilibrium.
From (2), it follows that monetary policymakers should stabilize the output gap,
yWt = bY Wt − eY Wt , i.e. the deviations of area output from its natural rate, as well as
the deviations of the terms of trade bTt from their natural rate eTt. Indeed, following
an asymmetric shock, eﬃciency requires that relative prices should be moved in order
to shift the burden of adjustment “equally” across regions. Monetary policymakers
8Where the relationship among the structural parameters of the model, and the welfare coeﬃ-
cients is given by:
Ω ≡ 1
2
UCC(nd
H + (1− n)dF )σ(1 + ση)
Λ ≡ 1σ
ρ+ η
1 + ση
1
ndH + (1− n)dF , d
i =
αi
(1− αi)(1− αiβ) , i = H,F
Γ ≡ 1σ
1 + η
1 + ση
1
ndH + (1− n)dF ,
θ ≡ nd
H
ndH + (1− n)dF .
ψ ≡ ω
H
αH(1− ωH) ,
An appendix on the details of the derivation is available online.
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should also stabilize a weighted average of the squares of the producer inflation rates in
each region. However, there is a trade-oﬀ between stabilizing inflation in both regions
and stabilizing relative prices to their natural level, in fact as prices are stable within
a region, the terms of trade cannot be moved to oﬀset asymmetric shocks. This trade-
oﬀ is further amplified by the last term in the loss function. Given the importance
of past inflation for understanding inflation persistence in the area, as in Amato and
Laubach (2001) and Steinsson (2000), we obtain that monetary policymakers should
also stabilize the growth of inflation in the hybrid region H. This term follows from
the presence in this region of backward-looking agents that behave according to the
rule of thumb. In the case in which the fraction of backward-looking agents becomes
zero, the last term disappears and the welfare criterion collapses to the one in Benigno
(2001a).
As noted in our empirical section, here we recall the aggregate supply specifications
in the log-linear form. For the F and H regions, we obtain respectively:
πF,t = λF cmcFt + β Et{πF,t+1}, (3)
πH,t = γHb πH,t−1 + λH cmcHt + γHf Et{πH,t+1}, (4)
where the coeﬃcients λF , λH , γHb and γHf correspond to the parameters defined in the
empirical section, with the appropriate upper script. For each region, we can further
decompose the real marginal costs by using the structure implied by the consumer’s
optimizing behavior. In deriving (3) and (4), we have assumed that each diﬀerentiated
good j is produced according to the production function yj = Aif(N j) where Ai is a
region-specific productivity shock. Given this assumption, the average real marginal
cost in region F can be related to
mcFt =
MCFt
PF,t
=
wFt
Pt
Pt
PF,t
1
AFt f
0(f−1(Y Ft /AFt )
,
where the foreign nominal marginal costs,MCFt , has been deflated by the appropriate
foreign producer price index PF and the average real wage is determined by the
marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption as in
eVN(NFt ,eξFS,t)
UC(CFt , ξFD,t)
=
wFt
Pt
. (5)
We can then substitute and obtain
mcFt =
eVN(f−1(Y Ft /AFt ),eξFS,t)
UC(CFt , ξFD,t)
Pt
PF,t
1
AFt f
0(f−1(Y Ft /AFt ))
.
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Following Woodford (2000), we define
V (yj, ξiS,t) ≡ eV (f−1(yj/Ait),eξiS,t),
where the vector ξiS has been appropriately modified. We can then write the average
real marginal costs as
mcFt =
Vy(C
W
t T
−n
t , ξFS,t)
UC(CFt , ξFD,t)
T−nt .
where foreign output has been written as Y F = CWT−n, with the world consumption
denoted by CW . Taking a log-linear approximation of the above equation, we obtain
that the deviations of the average real marginal costs from the steady state are
cmcFt = (ρ+ η)(bY Wt − eY Wt )− n(1 + η)(bTt − eTt),
in which we have defined the inverse of the elasticity of the disutility of supply
goods and of the elasticity of substitution in consumption as η ≡ VyyY
F
/Vy and
ρ = −UCCC
F
/UC respectively. Following the same steps, we get the log-linear ap-
proximation of the average marginal costs for the hybrid country H as
cmcHt = (ρ+ η)(bY Wt − eY Wt ) + (1− n)(1 + η)(bTt − eTt).
Finally we can write the aggregate supply equation for the region F as
πF,t = kFC(bY Wt − eY Wt )− nkFT (bTt − eT ) + βEt{πF,t+1} (6)
where
kFC ≡
(1− αFβ)(1− αF )
αH
ρ+ η
1 + ση and k
F
T = k
F
C
1 + η
ρ+ η .
As in the corresponding closed-economy version, inflation depends on present and
expected future values of the real marginal costs. However, in an open-economy
framework, the real marginal costs are not proportional to the output gap, as a
consequence of the interdependence induced by the international relative prices. This
result has been firstly shown by Svensson (2000). The smaller and more open the
country is, the more relative prices influence the real marginal costs and thus inflation
rates. In the same way, the aggregate supply equation for region H is
πH,t = γHb πH,t−1 + kHC (bY Wt − eY Wt ) + (1− n)kHT (bTt − eTt) + γHf Et{πH,t+1} (7)
where
γHb ≡
wH
wH(1− αH + αHβ) + αH and γ
H
f ≡
γHb αHβ
wH
,
kHC ≡
ρ+ η
1 + ση
(1− ωH)(1− αH)(1− αHβ)
[wH(1− αH + αHβ) + αH ] , and k
H
T ≡
1 + η
ρ+ ηk
H
C .
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The model is closed with the terms-of-trade identity which in a log-linear approx-
imation, can be written as bTt = bTt−1 + πFt − πHt . (8)
In the optimal plan monetary policymakers are committed to maximize the welfare
function (2) under the constraints given by the structural equations (6), (7) and (8).
Because of the existing trade-oﬀ, the optimal plan is highly complicated. We do not
go into the details of the characterization of the optimal plan. Instead we look at
simpler rules.
In the analysis that follows, in keeping with the empirical section, we ‘calibrate’
the parameter σ equal to 6, which corresponds to a steady-state mark-up of 1.2. We
set the inverse of the elasticity of substitution in consumption, ρ, equal to 1/6 as in
the recent work of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). The elasticity of the disutility of
producing the diﬀerentiated goods is set equal to 0.6. Considering a reasonable value
of the share of labor in total output of 0.75, then the implied Frisch elasticity of labor
supply is equal to 5.9 Moreover, the empirical analysis of the previous section has
suggested a possible partition of the countries analyzed in two groups. Accordingly,
we can then calibrate the size of region H to n = 0.6 while the size of region F will
be (1− n) = 0.4. Finally, we consider that the economy is subject to terms of trade
shocks following a Markovian process of the kind:
eTt = τ eTt−1 + εt,
where we set τ = 0.9. As results from the micro-foundation of the model, these
terms-of-trade shocks originate from asymmetric supply shocks. The value chosen for
τ is consistent with the calibration used in the international business cycle literature,
e.g. Backus et al. (1992) and Kehoe and Perri (2000).
4 Inflation Targeting and Nominal Rigidities in
the Presence of Backward Looking Price-setters
As already described in section 1, the hybrid model can sometimes oﬀer a complemen-
tary explanation of the persistence in inflation that is currently observed (see Galí,
Gertler and López-Salido (2001)). Still, one open issue is to address the evaluation of
the degree of nominal rigidity implicit in such a hybrid formulation. In the forward
looking model, we already know the answer. For a given fraction αF of agents that in
each period are constrained to keep their prices constant, an indicator of the degree
9This value is in line with most of the authors in the RBC literature. Actually, our value of 5 is
lower than the value used by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), and it is clearly lower than infinite
which is the value that corresponds to Hansen’s model of indivisibilities (1985). Nevertheless, these
values are higher than the ones emerging from the microeconometric estimates of the labor supply
literature (e.g., see Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986).
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of nominal rigidity is given by the average length or duration of contracts in units of
time represented by DF = 1/(1 − αF ). However, in the hybrid model, there is no
direct answer.
To deal with this issue we note that there are two components aﬀecting the degree
of rigidity. The first is given by the fraction of agents that cannot adjust their prices
but that behave in a forward-looking manner, formally: (1− ωH)αH . The second is
given by the fraction of agents that behave according to the rule of thumb (ωH). Our
aim is to map the pair of parameters (αH , ωH) into an equivalent value of αF .
The aim of this section is to find a correspondence between the nominal rigidity
intrinsic in the hybrid model and that of the forward-looking model within the class
of inflation targeting policies described above. Hence, as a criterion for such an
evaluation we choose the class of optimal inflation-targeting policies, i.e. the weight
ξ in the class of inflation-targeting policies
ξπHt + (1− ξ)πFt = 0, (9)
where ξ is chosen to maximize the welfare criterion (2) subject to the structural
equations of the model ((6), (7) and (8)). Why do we proceed in such a way? In fact,
as shown in Benigno (2001a), in a model with only forward-looking agents, in the
event the degrees of rigidity are the same across the two regions, the optimal choice
of ξ will be equal to n, which is the size of region H. Each region’s inflation rate
receives a weight equal to its economic size (i.e. this coincides with HICP targeting).
But, for values of the degrees of rigidity in region H higher than region F , a weight
bigger than n will be given to region H (and viceversa in the opposite case). Hence, a
pair (αH , ωH) will be equivalent to αF if the optimal weight ξ coincides with n. This
equivalency has a natural interpretation in the case where ωH is equal to zero, because
it directly relates the inflation weights to the duration and so to the parameters α0s.
But, what is the relevant measure of nominal rigidities in the hybrid country? Or,
in other words, how does the existence of backward-looking firms aﬀect the weights
of the optimal inflation targeting policy? Formally, in the case where ωH is diﬀerent
from zero, we will look for the pair (αH , ωH) that is equivalent in terms of implied
nominal rigidity to the single value αF in the optimal inflation targeting policy, if each
region’s inflation rate receives a weight equal to its economic size. Table 2 summarizes
some of the results.10
For any given duration implicit in the forward-looking supply equation (the columns
in the table), and for any given fraction of backward-looking agents (the rows in the
table) each cell represents the value of αH consistent with that duration according to
our mapping criterion. As the fraction of backward looking agents increases, a lower
value of αH is needed to match the implicit duration (i.e. the degree of stickiness) of
the forward-looking model. Likewise, Figure 3 shows the same results for a broader
grid of parameters. An interesting observation that we can derive from this figure is
10The model is calibrated according to the parameters of the previous section.
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that, for reasonable values of duration (usually slightly higher than 3 or 4 quarters),
a good approximation of the duration in the hybrid model is given by the following
expression:
DH =
1
1− αH
1
1− ωH ,
which is the duration that could be derived by observing that the total fraction of
agents that have prices fixed or that behave according to the rule of thumb is given
by ωH + (1− ωH)αH .
Hence, we have found the correspondence between the rigidity intrinsic in the
hybrid model and that of the forward-looking model within the class of inflation-
targeting policies described above. When the two rigidities are the same, the optimal
inflation-targeting policy requires that each region receives a weight equal to its eco-
nomic size. If region H has a higher degree of rigidity, a weight higher than n should
be given to inflation in this region.
The empirical section has provided an estimation of the parameters αH ,αF and
ωH . At the estimated point, we obtain that the rigidity implicit in the forward-
looking countries is around 5 quarters, while in the hybrid model it is around 8
quarters, according to the rough measure of rigidity DH . This suggests that in the
optimal inflation-targeting policy a higher weight, greater than size n, should be given
to region H. In fact, by simulating for the optimal weight, we find that bξ = 0.797,
well above the value of HICP-targeting (0.60).
Given the uncertainty surrounding our estimates, in Tables 3 we provide a sensi-
tivity analysis on how alternative degrees of stickiness in both areas would aﬀect the
optimal bξ. In particular, in the forward looking area, we consider that the degree of
rigidity can vary between 3 and 6 quarters, while in the hybrid region the degree of
uncertainty of our estimates is somewhat higher, so we consider that this rigidity is
between 7 and 12 quarters. In particular, in the hybrid region, we fix the parameter
ωH and let the parameter αH vary so as to obtain the degrees of rigidity in the range
between 7 and 12 quarters. In Table 3a we set ωH equal to the point estimate 0.48,
while in Tables 3b and 3c it assumes the lower and the upper bound on the 95% con-
fidence interval, 0.34 and 0.61, respectively. In the intervals considered the optimal
choice of bξ varies between 0.7 to 0.95, reaching the smallest value when the diﬀerence
in the durations across regions is small, while the largest value is obtained when the
diﬀerence is large. Indeed, in this experiment, we have considered that the diﬀerence
in durations ranges from 1 quarter to 9 quarters. However, for the central parts of
the intervals considered, the optimal choice of bξ is stable around 0.8-0.85. Most in-
terestingly, the optimal bξ is robust across diﬀerent sources of rigidity, whether from
the backward-looking component or the forward-looking one. This is consistent with
our previous findings which emphasize that what matters for evaluating the degree of
rigidity in the hybrid region is the composite duration, given by the index DH instead
of DF .
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5 Terms-of-Trade Shocks and Monetary Policy
In this section, we compare the adjustment of the economies in responses to terms-
of-trade shocks under diﬀerent monetary policies from both positive and normative
viewpoints. In particular, we focus on four alternative policy rules. The first policy
under consideration is the fully optimal policy. Formally, this implies that monetary
policymakers are committed to maximizing the welfare function (2) under the con-
straints given by the structural equations (6), (7) and (8). The second class is the
optimal inflation targeting policy in which policymakers are committed to the class of
policies given by the previous expression (9) and they choose optimally ξ. The third
class is HICP targeting which belongs to the previous class; but, unlike the previous
case, the parameter ξ is set to be equal to the size of the H country, say n.11 It is
always the case that optimal policy performs at least as well as the optimal inflation
targeting policy, while the latter is always at least as good as HICP-targeting. Fi-
nally, we further analyze a policy aimed at stabilizing the output gap of the area, i.e.
setting yWt = 0 at all dates t.
5.1 Output Gap Targeting
Why do we focus on the latter policy? Notice that within the theoretical framework
described above this policy can be easily ranked in terms of the previous ones when
both regions have only forward-looking agents. To see this let us consider conditions
(6), (7) under the assumption that ωH = 0. It can be shown that, in this case, the
policy that stabilizes the output gap coincides with a policy within the class of the
inflation-targeting policies where the weight ξ is chosen to be:
ξ = nk
F
T
(1− n)kHT + nkFT
. (10)
Thus, it is then the case that by stabilizing the area output gap, policymakers are
implicitly pursuing an inflation-targeting policy, not an optimal one, although the
performance of this output-gap targeting policy is nested in that of the optimal
inflation-targeting policy. In fact, we will show that the stabilization of the output
gap in the area performs at least as well as HICP-targeting, given that the weights
to the inflation rates are adjusted as to weight more the region with higher degree
of rigidity in the area (see expression (10)). In particular, the weight given to re-
gion H is higher the greater is the size of this economy (higher n), and the higher
the degree of flexibility of region F in response to terms-of-trade shocks (i.e. higher
11A kind of HICP targeting can be seen as the policy followed by the European Central Bank
(Alesina et al. (2001)). HICP stands for Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices. The HICP inflation
of the whole euro area is constructed as a weighted average of the HICP of the single countries belong-
ing to the union, with weights equal to the share of the country’s consumption in the consumption
of the area.
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kFT ).Things are more complicated when ωH is diﬀerent from zero. Under such cir-
cumstances, the output-gap stabilization policy is no longer nested in the class of the
inflation-targeting policy.
5.2 Welfare Comparisons
A numerical quantification appears in Table 4, where we present the welfare com-
parisons among all the above-mentioned policies. We summarize the comparisons
in terms of the variability of the variables that are relevant for the computation of
welfare, using the statistic v(.). This operator, v(.), applied to the generic variable
x, is defined as follows:
v(x) = E[E0(1− β)
+∞X
t=0
βtx2t ].
where, as in Woodford (1999a), the unconditional expectations E are taken over
the possible initial states of the economy eT0. By using this operator, it is possible
to analyze welfare, W , as a composite of the operator v(.) applied to the relevant
variables. Thus, we are able to understand the contribution of the relative volatilities
of inflation and output to welfare under alternative policy rules. In particular, we
can decompose welfare in five components: first, the output gap of the area v(yW );
second, the output-gap diﬀerential or the terms of trade gap v(bT − eT )12; third and
fourth, the contributions of inflation in both areas, i.e. v(πF ) and v(πH), respectively;
and finally the changes in inflation in the sticky inflation area (i.e. the area where the
hybrid model applies) v(∆πH). As shown in Table 4 we have ranked welfare starting
from the worst policy, HICP-targeting, and ending with the fully optimal one. In
particular, we provide a measure of the losses in terms of permanent percentage shift
in steady-state consumption. To this end, we define the index δ as
δj ≡ −(1− β) ·
·
W j −WE
UCC
¸
,
where WE is welfare under the eﬃcient policy, which is not feasible; W j is welfare
indexed by the four policies that are considered in this experiment, while UC is the
marginal utility of consumption and C is the steady-state level of consumption. Thus
δj measures the permanent percentage shift in steady-state consumption that is lost
under the policy j with respect to the eﬃcient level.
Table 4 summarizes the comparisons, where the variance of the shock ε has been
normalized to one. However, the variance of ε is crucial for evaluating the magnitude
12Notice that the output gap diﬀerential is proportional to the terms-of-trade gap, i.e. formally
the following relationship holds:
yHt − yFt = bTt − eTt.
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of the costs in terms of a permanent shift in steady-state consumption. In keeping
with the international real business cycle literature, we calibrate the variance of ε
to be 0.012. Using the measure δ, we have then evaluated the costs of the fully
optimal policy to be around 0.0148 percent of a permanent shift in steady-state
consumption.13 Output-gap stabilization approximates the welfare that would be
achieved under the optimal policy. The optimal inflation-targeting policy performs
considerably better than HICP-targeting but less than the optimal policy and output-
gap stabilization policy. Indeed, the costs of the HICP targeting and the optimal
inflation targeting policies are of the order of 0.023 and 0.020 percent, respectively.
The output stabilization policy is quite close to the fully optimal one since many of
the welfare gains in the fully optimal policy arises from the fact that the output gap
is almost fully stabilized in the area. Notice also that in the fully optimal policy the
output gap of the area is not fully stabilized but the relative output gaps or the terms
of trade are much more stabilized than in the case of the output gap stabilization
policy. Inflation-targeting policies are far enough from the previous two policies,
because they imply that the output gap of the area is far from stabilized.
An interesting observation is that all the policies under consideration perform
equally in terms of the variance of the terms-of-trade gap. Given the high degree of
price rigidity, and the persistence of the relative price shock, the terms of trade can
adjust only slowly. Hence, monetary policy cannot eﬃciently shift the unfavorable
shocks in regionH to region F . In terms of the welfare function (2), it can only control
the area output gap and, marginally, the inflation rates in each region. However, for
this calibrated example, the weights on the inflation rates are of an order of magnitude
100 times larger than the weights on the output gap, thus they matter far more for
the maximization of welfare. Interestingly, in our case, the output gap policy is then
also able not to destabilize the inflation rates.
5.3 Dynamic Adjustments
To gain intuition on the previous results, in Figures 4 and 5 we plot the impulse
response functions of the variables that are relevant for the computation of welfare
following a negative shock to the terms of trade, namely an unexpected transitory
drop in eT . This shock can be interpreted as a decrease in productivity in country H
relative to country F. Eﬃciency would require that terms-of-trade changes oﬀset com-
pletely terms of trade shocks, without any movements in domestic inflation rates and
output gaps. However, in a currency area, such eﬃcient equilibrium is not feasible.
After the unfavorable terms-of-trade shocks, inflation in region H increases, while it
decreases in region F . Under the HICP-targeting regime, inflation increases more in
region H and decreases less in region F than under the optimal plan. In fact, HICP
targeting does not adjust for the diﬀerences in the degrees of rigidity across countries.
13Lucas (1988) has evaluated the costs of the business cycle to be around 0.05 percent of a
permanent shift in steady-state consumption.
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On the other hand, the optimal inflation-targeting policy gives a higher weight to the
inflation rate in region H, which has a higher degree of rigidity. Hence, it succeeds
in stabilizing more the inflation in that region. However, it fails in stabilizing the
area output gap. HICP-targeting further exacerbates fluctuations in the area output
gap. It so happens that, in our calibrated-estimated economy, the fully optimal plan
requires quasi-stabilization of the output-gap at the area wide level. It is then the
case that the policy of stabilizing the area output-gap completely can approximate
the optimal plan well. By stabilizing the area output-gap, it is also possible to reach
the right inertia in inflation rates that the commitment to the optimal policy requires,
so the path of the inflation rates is also stabilized.
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In Figures 6 and 7, we compare the diﬀerent policies under a broad range of parame-
ters. First, in Figure 6, we fix the average duration at the area level at 6 quarters,
and we let the relative duration across the regions vary (for diﬀerent values of ωH).
The average duration is defined as DW = (DH)n(DF )1−n, while the relative duration
is DR = DH/DF . As the fraction of backward-looking agents increase, output-gap
stabilization performs well compared to the optimal inflation-targeting policy. But
this depends on relative duration. Not surprisingly, area output targeting is a sym-
metric policy in a world in which there are big asymmetries. It works well when the
duration of the hybrid model exceeds that of forward-looking model. It does not work
when, notwithstanding the backward-looking component, the hybrid-model region is
less rigid than the forward-looking region. Figure 7 performs the same analysis for
an average duration of 3 quarters. In particular, Figures 8 and 9 show a case in
which output-gap targeting is destabilizing. In these figures, we have assumed that
the forward-looking component in the hybrid region is such that αH = 0.5, while we
have kept ωH = 0.5 and αF = 0.785.
There is some intuition as to why, under some parametrization, the stabilization
of the output gap can approximate the optimal policy. In fact, the example in Figures
8 and 9 diﬀers from Figures 4 and 5 because the main factor of rigidity in the hybrid
region is given by the backward-looking (ωH). Looking back to the AS equation in
the hybrid region
πH,t = γHb πH,t−1 + kHC (bY Wt − eY Wt ) + (1− n)kHT (bTt − eTt) + γHf Et{πH,t+1}, (11)
when the rigidity in the forward-looking component (αH) decreases, for a given ωH
, all the coeﬃcients γHb , kHC , kHT and γHf increase. Indeed, past inflation becomes
more important, and the short-run reaction to real marginal costs increase. Given
that the terms of trade move very slowly, under the policy of stabilization of the
output-gap, the terms of trade shock has a bigger impact on inflation rates. Given
the importance of the backward-looking component, this eﬀect is transmitted also in
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the future periods. Alternatively, when αH is higher, the impact of the terms-of-trade
shocks on inflation is smaller, as is their persistence and volatility.
6 Conclusions
We have shown that there are sizeable diﬀerences in rigidities across the countries
belonging to the European Monetary Union. In particular, as a criterion for evalu-
ation, we rely on a microfounded welfare function which, in the spirit of King and
Wolman (1998) and Woodford (1999b), allows for an evaluation of the deadweight
losses existing in the model. The idea that monetary policy should be geared to
eliminating the distortions in the relative price mechanism is close to the principle
under which a mandate of price stability has been delegated to the ECB. In fact, as
stressed in the 1999 Bulletin of the ECB (January 1999), the main argument for price
stability is that it improves the transparency of the relative price mechanism thereby
avoiding distortions and helping to ensure that the market allocates real resources
eﬃciently both across uses and over time. According to the criterion of eﬃciency
followed by the ECB, our framework has shown that the quantitative target in terms
of stabilization of the HICP does not fully succeed in eliminating the distortions in
the relative price mechanism.
We have proposed two policies that may perform better: the optimal inflation
targeting policy, which implies that the inflation rate in the region with higher degree
of rigidity should receive a higher weight; and the output-gap stabilization policy.
An inflation targeting policy that assigns higher weight to countries with higher
degrees of inflation persistence benefits those countries since once the policy of the
central bank is credible, it produces lower inflation rates for them simply because
it cares more about those inflation rates. Notwithstanding, such a rigidity-adjusted
inflation-targeting policy may create the wrong incentives for the adoptions by the
countries of structural changes that reduce their goods and labor market rigidities.
This concern does not consider that once there are rigidities in the price mechanism,
relative prices move also sluggishly, so asymmetric shocks would require enough flex-
ibility in the adjustment of relative prices.
The policy of stabilizing the output gap is immune to this adverse-incentive criti-
cism as it gives a weight to each country similar to its economic size as in the HICP-
targeting policy. Our analysis shows that, in cases where the inertia in the terms of
trade is high and there are important backward looking components in inflation in
some zones of the area, monitoring the output gap can give the right information on
the final goal. However, as we have shown, it is less robust across diﬀerent parame-
trizations, and in some cases may perform worse than HICP targeting. Moreover, it
is more diﬃcult to implement since it involves the unobservability of the natural level
of output. While, in our context, the natural level indicates the flexible-price equi-
librium, there are several other concepts of the natural rate as well as several ways
to measure it, as outlined also in McCallum (2001). Thus, a policy of stabilization of
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the output gap is neither easy to implement nor to communicate to private agents.
These arguments suggest that it may not be desirable to abandon HICP-targeting
for optimal inflation targeting as defined in this paper. Nevertheless, it also empha-
sizes that inflation diﬀerentials are not irrelevant for monetary policy. First we have
to be conscious of the welfare costs associated to the distribution of inflation across
countries; and second, cross country inflation information can provide useful infor-
mation as far as the degree of inertia diﬀers across countries.
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Table 1. Price Stickiness in Euro Area Countries
Hybrid Model
ω α β γb γf eλ D J Test
Germany (1) 0.075
(0.049)
0.785
(0.033)
0.757
(0.076)
0.089
(0.055)
0.702
(0.073)
0.096
(0.028)
5.0
(0.19)
9.538
(0.731)
(2) 0.026
(0.057)
0.743
(0.032)
0.790
(0.098)
0.035
(0.073)
0.767
(0.108)
0.135
(0.038)
4.0
(0.21)
8.523
(0.482)
France (1) 0.326
(0.073)
0.784
(0.061)
0.903
(0.059)
0.300
(0.043)
0.653
(0.041)
0.040
(0.030)
6.8
(0.16)
7.761
(0.859)
(2) 0.331
(0.066)
0.771
(0.059)
0.884
(0.069)
0.308
(0.040)
0.635
(0.048)
0.046
(0.032)
6.5
(0.13)
7.413
(0.594)
Italy (1) 0.594
(0.052)
0.682
(0.042)
0.691
(0.091)
0.516
(0.032)
0.409
(0.047)
0.059
(0.023)
7.6
(0.03)
10.98
(0.613)
(2) 0.660
(0.053)
0.709
(0.058)
0.619
(0.163)
0.554
(0.053)
0.368
(0.084)
0.047
(0.027)
10.1
(0.03)
6.924
(0.645)
Spain (1) 0.667
(0.090)
0.769
(0.044)
0.841
(0.131)
0.495
(0.019)
0.477
(0.052)
0.020
(0.018)
12.9
(0.05)
7.739
(0.860)
(2) 0.724
(0.147)
0.797
(0.075)
0.890
(0.171)
0.497
(0.021)
0.486
(0.067)
0.011
(0.019)
17.8
(0.07)
4.620
(0.866)
Netherlands (1) 0.371
(0.057)
0.638
(0.063)
0.993
(0.137)
0.368
(0.041)
0.629
(0.048)
0.083
(0.029)
4.4
(0.06)
7.069
(0.898)
(2) 0.358
(0.063)
0.643
(0.075)
1.060
(0.168)
0.353
(0.044)
0.671
(0.067)
0.72
(0.040)
4.4
(0.07)
5.174
(0.819)
Note: Sample period 70-98. The average labor income shares are set to be equal to 0.75,
and the steady-state markup is µ = 1.20. Column D corresponds to price duration, and
J Test to the Hansen test of the overidentifying restrictions (below in brackets we report
the p-value). Estimates in row (1) use as instruments are: inflation, detrended output,
real unit labor costs and wage inflation from t-1 to t-4; while in row (2) we use five lags
of inflation and two lags of the rest of variables. In the estimates of the Netherlands we
include a dummy variable taking the value of 1 after 1982:1.
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Table 2
αF (Duration in quarters)
αH 0.500 (2) 0.660 (3) 0.750 (4) 0.830 (6) 0.875 (8) 0.937 (16)
0.0 0.500 0.660 0.750 0.830 0.875 0.937
0.1 0.440 0.625 0.725 0.810 0.865 0.930
0.2 0.365 0.580 0.695 0.790 0.845 0.925
0.3 0.250 0.525 0.650 0.760 0.825 0.907
0.4 0.010 0.430 0.595 0.725 0.790 0.890
ωH
0.5 - 0.265 0.500 0.675 0.750 0.875
0.6 - - 0.335 0.575 0.600 0.830
0.7 - - 0.020 0.425 0.595 0.810
0.8 - - - 0.105 0.410 0.720
0.9 - - - - 0.050 0.570
Note: Duration corresponds to the expression DF = (1 − αF )−1. Each cell,
corresponding to a pair αF (in the columns) and ωH (in the rows), represents the
value of αH such that the rigidity implied by (αH , ωH), in the hybrid region, is
equivalent to the rigidity implied by αF , in the forward-looking region.
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Table 3(a). Optimal Weights to Region H under Inflation Targeting (ξ)
Duration Duration (Forward Looking Region)
(Backward Looking Region) 3 4 5 6
7 0.882 0.815 0.752 0.697
8 0.905 0.850 0.797 0.752
9 0.922 0.877 0.835 0.795
10 0.935 0.897 0.860 0.827
12 0.957 0.932 0.907 0.882
Note: The duration in the hybrid region is computed by varying the parameter αH ,
maintaining the parameter ωH=0.48.
Table 3(b). Optimal Weights to Region H under Inflation Targeting (ξ)
Duration Duration (Forward Looking Region)
(Backward Looking Region) 3 4 5 6
7 0.867 0.790 0.722 0.665
8 0.892 0.827 0.767 0.720
9 0.910 0.855 0.805 0.760
10 0.925 0.877 0.832 0.795
12 0.945 0.910 0.875 0.845
Note: The duration in the hybrid region is computed by varying the parameter αH ,
maintaining the parameter ωH=0.34.
Table 3(c). Optimal Weights to Region H under Inflation Targeting (ξ)
Duration Duration (Forward Looking Region)
(Backward Looking Region) 3 4 5 6
7 0.900 0.837 0.777 0.725
8 0.920 0.872 0.825 0.780
9 0.937 0.897 0.857 0.822
10 0.947 0.915 0.882 0.852
12 0.962 0.940 0.928 0.895
Note: The duration in the hybrid region is computed by varying the parameter αH ,
maintaining the parameter ωH=0.61.
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Table 4: Welfare and Variability Comparisons
v(yW ) v(bT − eT ) v(πH) v(πF ) v(∆πH) δ
HICP-targeting 2.1253 2.4923 0.0494 0.1112 0.0008 2.31
Optimal Inflation Targeting 1.0165 2.5210 0.0109 0.1884 0.0002 2.03
Output-Gap Stabilization 0.0000 2.5119 0.0840 0.0800 0.0007 1.52
Optimal Policy 0.0221 2.5094 0.0566 0.1041 0.0005 1.48
Note: σ2ε has been normalized to 1%.
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Figure 1. Inflation and Marginal Cost in Euro area countries
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Figure 2. Stability Analysis
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Figure 3: Lines of equivalence between the forward looking components (αH,αF), by varying the backward looking component (ωH)
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Figure 4: Impulse Response Functions, α
H
=0.75, ω
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=0.785 
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Figure 5: Impulse Response Functions, α
H
=0.75, ω
H
=0.48, α
F
=0.785 
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Figure 6: Welfare Comparisons, Average Duration= 6 quarters 
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Figure 7: Welfare Comparisons, Average Duration = 3 quarters 
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Figure 8: Impulse Response Functions, α
H
=0.5, ω
H
=0.48, α
F
=0.785  
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 Figure 9: Impulse Response Function, α
H
=0.5, ω
H
=0.48, α
F
=0.785
